



No 4265. 154



GIVEN BY
Family of

William Lloyd Garrison

Boston Public Library

Do not write in this book or mark it with pen or pencil. Penalties for so doing are imposed by the Revised Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

*This book was issued to the borrower on the date
last stamped below.*

[illegible]

THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY

OF THE

4265. 154
Federal Government

TO ABOLISH

AMERICAN SLAVERY:

AN EXPOSE

OF THE

POSITION OF THE ABOLITION SOCIETY

OF

NEW-YORK CITY AND VICINITY.

PUBLIC LIBRARY

NEW-YORK.

PUBLISHED BY THE ABOLITION SOC. OF NEW-YORK CITY, ETC.,
48 BEEKMAN STREET.

1855

EXPOSITION.

DUTY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO ABOLISH SLAVERY.

THE Abolition Society of New-York City and vicinity, at its organization, issued an Address to the people of the United States, in exposition of its principles and objects, and inviting the friends of liberty, in their several localities, to organize similar societies. In addition to this, the Executive Committee have now thought it advisable to make a brief exposition of their Constitution, together with a condensed outline of the course of argument by which its peculiar positions are sustained.

THE NAME OF THE SOCIETY.

— *Anti-Slavery* Societies have been chiefly occupied in exposing the nature, the character, and the effects of slavery, and urging the duty and safety of immediate and unconditional emancipation. *This* Society takes the name of *Abolition* Society, as more properly indicative of its specific design to procure the *abolition* of slavery—the suppression, by civil government, and particularly by the Federal Government, of the criminal practice of *slaveholding*.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE ILLEGALITY OF SLAVERY.

When we say that slavery is *illegal*, we mean not merely that it is morally wrong, wicked, or sinful, in the

sight of God, but that it is likewise unlawful, *by the established principles of human jurisprudence*, just as murder, arson, robbery, theft, and assault and battery, are unlawful, and that there is no more valid law for the one than there is for the other. We mean that slaveholding is illegal, as other criminal practices are illegal. We affirm that there is no legislation in any of the States that makes it legal. We maintain that, even without any legislation against slavery, it is *now* the right and duty of the Courts of Justice to liberate any slave who may bring a suit for his or her freedom.

WHY SLAVERY IS ILLEGAL.

We affirm its illegality on two general grounds: *First*, Slavery can not possibly *be* legalized. *Second*, If it could be, it *never has* been, and is not now, legalized in this country. The ground first mentioned is that of an universal and immutable *principle*; the second is that of *history*, and of existing local *fact*.

FIRST, *Slavery can not possibly be legalized*. In its very nature it is incapable of legalization. The standard writers on common law affirm the impossibility of legalizing slavery, even by positive municipal law. They declare the right to liberty to be inalienable, and that statutes against fundamental morality are void.*

The nature of civil government and of civil law, as defined by all standard writers on those subjects, proves it impossible to legalize slavery.† “To secure” man’s inalienable rights, “governments are instituted among men.” And consequently they can have no lawful authority to violate the rights which they exist only to protect. The protection of human rights necessarily in-

* Coke, Fortescue, Blackstone, etc.

† Moses, Cicero, Justinian, Coke, Fortescue, Lyttleton, Blackstone, Jacob, (Law Dictionary,) Hobart, Noyes, Wood, Hampden, Witherspoon, Vattel, Hooker, etc.

volves the prohibition and suppression of slaveholding. Having no legal authority to violate men's natural rights, governments can delegate no such authority to others. The powers of civil government are limited. But they would be unlimited, if they could have the authority and the power to legalize the enslavement of their subjects. All the declarations ever made (and they have abounded in all civilized nations and ages) that all men are created equal, that all men are entitled to personal liberty, and that governments are for the protection of rights,* are so many declarations that slavery is incapable of legalization. All the venerated definitions of *law* go to the same point. "Whatever is *just*," says Cicero, "is also the true *law*, nor can this true law be abrogated by any written enactments." "Municipal law," says Blackstone, "is properly defined to be a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is RIGHT, and prohibiting what is WRONG." "Political law," says Witherspoon, "is the authority of any society stamped upon moral duty." And, according to Jacob's Law Dictionary, "Law" is "the rule and bond of men's actions, or it is a rule for the well-government of civil society, to give to *every* man that which doth BELONG to him."

In short, the entire science of civil government and civil law will have to be revised and revolutionized before slavery can be made legal.

SECOND, But, if it were possible to legalize slavery, it is historically certain that it never *has* been legalized in this country. No statutes have been enacted that could have legalized it—none that have even pretended to do so. To this point we have the testimony of the prominent slaveholding statesmen and jurists of America.

* See Letters on Slavery, by O. S. Freeman; containing quotations from Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and other renowned men of antiquity and of subsequent ages

The late John C. Calhoun, of South-Carolina;* Judge Matthews, of Louisiana;† Senator Mason, of Virginia, Mr. Baylys, Representative in Congress from the same State;‡ Senator Douglas, of Illinois, Mr. Toombs, of Georgia;§ Gen. Stringfellow, of Missouri, with Hon. S. C. Brooks and John McQueen, of South-Carolina, William Smith, of Virginia, and Thomas L. Clingman, of North-Carolina,|| (Members of Congress,) and Southern editors generally, affirm that slavery grew up in the American Colonies without any positive enactments creating or authorizing it—that nothing of that character is known to the legislation of this country—although statutes have been framed to regulate what was *assumed* to have had a previous legal existence. And yet it is admitted by the Southern Courts that slavery is contrary to natural right and to common law, and can only exist by the force of local, municipal, positive law. On this ground, the Southern Courts have liberated slaves who had been carried by consent of their masters beyond the limits of the local jurisdiction where they had been held as slaves.¶ The Supreme Court of the United States (in the case of

* Reply to T. H. Benton, 1849.

† American Slave Code, pp. 266–268. “No legislative act of the colonies can be found in relation to it.”—*Wheeler's Law of Slavery*, pp. 8, 9.

‡ Mr. Mason objected to a jury trial for fugitives on the ground that such a process would require that “proof shall be brought forward that slavery is established by existing laws;” and, said he, “it is impossible to comply with the requisition, for no such law can be produced.”—*Goodell's Slavery and Anti-Slavery*, pp. 570, 571.

§ Debates in Congress on the Nebraska Bill. Determined to carry slavery into Kansas and Nebraska without any statutory enactments creating it, they were driven to the necessity of declaring the truth that it had been introduced into all the slave States without statute.

|| These gentlemen assume the present legality of slavery in Kansas “without any positive law.” And they say “The veriest school-boy must know—as a matter of history—that, although slavery existed in all the old States, in not one of them was a law ever enacted to establish it.”—*New-York Daily Tribune*, Jan. 17, 1855.

¶ American Slave Code, pp. 261–264. *Wheeler's Law of Slavery*, 340–346, 348, 349, 335. *Story's Conflict of Laws*, 92–97. 8 *Louisiana Reports*, 475. 2 *Marshall's Kentucky Rep.*, 467. *Martin's Lou. Rep.*, 401. *Walker's Miss. Rep.*, 36.

Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters) declared that "the state of slavery is a mere municipal regulation, *founded upon and limited to* the verge of the territorial law." Putting these two statements together, the matter-of-fact illegality of American slavery is seen at a glance.

HISTORICAL OUTLINE.

The whole history of slavery and of the slave trade in England and her American Colonies shows that slavery has never been legalized.

The "permit" of Queen Elizabeth to John Hawkins, to carry Africans to the Colonies, forbade their transportation without their own free consent. But he took them away by brute force, and, therefore, in violation of the conditions of the permit under which he pretended to act.* All the subsequent acts of parliament "regulating the trade to Africa," particularly the act of 23 George II., chiefly relied upon by the slave traders, forbade, under heavy penalties, the carrying away of Africans by any act of "fraud, force, or violence."† But the whole history of the traffic proves it to have been prosecuted in open and direct violation of these prohibitions. So that the matter-of-fact African slave trade never was legalized. This was proved by William Pitt, in the British Parliament, and this led to the abolition of the slave trade.‡

When the slaves were landed in the Colonies and sold to the planters, there were no English or colonial statutes authorizing the procedure. Had there been any, they would have been of no valid force, because contrary to the British constitution and the English common law. This appears from the decision of Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, who, on this ground, liberated the slave Somerset,

* Clarkson's History, p. 30; Edwards' History of West-Indies, vol. 2, pp. 43, 44; Goodell's Slavery and Anti-Slavery p. 6

† Spooner's Unconstitutionality of Slavery, pp. 29-35.

‡ Clarkson's History, p. 314; Goodell's Slavery and Anti-Slavery, p. 65.

and declared slavery illegal in England, in the year 1772, four years before our Declaration of Independence. The same decision, though never enforced in the colonies, was legally binding upon them, as Granville Sharpe publicly maintained.* The colonial charters, moreover, restricted the colonial legislatures from passing any laws contrary to the common law of England, which forbids slavery.† And finally, there were no colonial enactments, up to the hour of the Declaration of Independence, that even undertook to legalize slavery, and there have been no such State enactments since.

The Declaration of Independence would have abolished slavery if it had had any previous legal existence. Add to this, the Constitutions of all the original States, formed soon after the Declaration of Independence, were incompatible with slavery. And so was the common law. On these grounds, the Courts in Massachusetts, without any legislative enactment on the subject, decided that slavery was illegal.‡ And slavery in all the other States stood precisely on the same basis.

No one charges upon the old "Articles of Confederation" any recognition of slavery. And no one supposes that the Federal Constitution originated it, or gave to it any legal validity which it did not possess before. The absolute illegality of slavery, at the time the Federal Constitution was adopted, is hence as certain as any legal fact of history can be, and no one pretends that it has acquired any additional legality since that time. *This fact* we have deemed an important one to be affirmed in the Constitution of our Abolition Society, as a foundation

* Stuart's Memoir of Sharpe; Clarkson's History; Slavery and Anti-Slavery, chap. vi.

† *Vide* Spooner.

‡ Pickering's Reports pp. 209 210; Kent's Commentary. p. 252; Washburn's Jud. Hist. Mass. p. 202; Dr Jonathan Edwards' Sermon, Sept 15, 1791. See Goodell's Slavery and Anti-Slavery, pp. 111, 112.

of our distinctive measures. We have, therefore, affirmed further that

“SLAVEHOLDING IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.”

It is a violation of the Constitution. It can not legally exist under the Constitution, which does not sanction nor even tolerate its existence.

If slavery be illegal it is unconstitutional, of course. If it was illegal when the Constitution was adopted, then the Constitution can contain no legal recognition of it—no binding compromise with it. The Constitution could not have recognized as legal what did not legally exist, could not have formed any valid compromise with it.

Slavery is unconstitutional because it is irreconcilably opposed to the declared *objects* of the Constitution, namely, “to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” These grand objects of the Constitution can never be secured so long as slavery is permitted to exist in the nation.

SLAVERY IS FORBIDDEN BY THE CONSTITUTION.

The Constitution forbids slavery by declaring that “no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law.” The phrase “due process of law,” means indictment and trial by jury for some alleged crime, and verdict and sentence in open Court. For this definition we have the authority of Lord Coke, Judge Story,* and Justice Bronson.† And by the two latter this definition is expressly applied to this clause of the Constitu-

* Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, in which he cites the definition of Lord Coke.

† Hill's Reports, iv., 146. *Vide* Gerrit Smith's speech in Congress on the Nebraska Bill.

tion of the United States. No one will pretend that any slave in the United States ever lost his *liberty* by this process, or that "due process of law" could ever reduce any man to *slavery*, though it may deprive him of liberty by imprisonment for crime. This provision of the Constitution is an "*Amendment*," which, like the codicil to a will, over-rides, displaces, and abrogates whatever in the original instrument might have been inconsistent with it.

In another "Amendment" the Constitution forbids slavery by providing that "the right of the people to be secure in their *persons*," etc, etc., "shall not be violated."

THE CONSTITUTION FORBIDS THE STATES TO MAINTAIN SLAVERY.

It does this by providing that "*No State* shall pass any bills of attainder or laws impairing the obligations of contracts;" nor "grant any title of nobility."

Slavery is an "attainder" because it "attaints the blood," and imposes disabilities on the child, on account of the condition of the parent. It establishes an order of nobility by that same process, and by conferring hereditary or transferable powers of subjugation and control upon *one* class or order of men over *another* class, their hereditary inferiors and subjects. It not merely impairs but annihilates the power of making contracts.

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR LIBERATION.

The Constitution not only forbids slavery but provides for the liberation of every slave, by declaring that "the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended in time of peace." "It is this writ," (says Christian, the annotator of Blackstone,) "which makes slavery impossible in England." Its proper application would make slavery impossible here.

"The object of the writ," (says Blackstone,) "is to bring the body of the person who has been restrained of liberty" into Court, "who shall determine *whether the cause* of his commitment *be just*, and thereupon to do, as JUSTICE shall appertain." (16 Charles I. c. 10. Blackstone's Com., B. I. 135.) "It is to be directed to the person *detaining another*, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and *cause of his capture and detention*," etc., "to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." Blackstone, B. I., 131.)

This writ, according to Blackstone, was designed to carry out, more perfectly, the provision of Magna Charta, that no man should be deprived of liberty "unless it be by legal indictment, or the process of common law;" which includes trial by jury.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS POWER TO ABOLISH SLAVERY.

It has this power just as clearly as it has power to secure the declared objects of the instrument that gave it existence for the *very purpose* of securing them—the power "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and *secure the blessings of liberty* to ourselves and our posterity." The power to do either *one* of these *six* things includes ample power to abolish slavery.

Congress has power to declare war and make peace. Slavery is an outrage on the slaves, and they are necessarily enemies to the nation that permits it. Congress, therefore, has power to make peace with the slaves by restoring to them their rights. John Quincy Adams affirmed the right of Congress to abolish slavery as a

means of defence in time of war. But until slavery is abolished, we are continually exposed to a state of war. And the same principle affirmed by Mr. Adams would warrant abolition as a means of preserving peace or of being prepared for war.

"Congress has power to provide for the *common defence* and general welfare of the United States." But this can not be done without abolishing slavery.

"Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." To "naturalize" a man is to change his condition from that of an alien to that of a free citizen. Under this clause Congress may determine whether or no the slaves are already free citizens. If they are, it can declare them to be so. If they are *not*, it can naturalize them, and *make* them such.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY BOUND TO ABOLISH SLAVERY.

The Constitution binds the Federal Government to abolish slavery in binding it to secure its own declared objects, (as already enumerated,) and in bringing the Federal Government into existence for this very end. If the Government is not bound to do this, it is bound to do nothing in support of the Constitution, or for the benefit of the people.

The Constitution provides, that "The United States SHALL guarantee to EVERY State in this Union a republican form of government." This makes it the duty of Congress to see to it that every State maintains republican institutions. But what is a republic? The Constitution itself, in its preamble and in the provisions already quoted, furnishes the definition.

"It is *essential* to a republican government that it be derived from the great body of society, *not* from an in-

considerable proportion, OR *a favored class of it.*" (Madison, in No. 39 of the *Federalist*.)

This was written for the especial object of persuading the people to adopt the Constitution, by convincing them that it provided a republican government.

"The true foundation of republican government is the equal rights of every citizen in his person and property, and in their management." (Jefferson.)

And Mr. Jefferson frequently calls the slaves *citizens*.*

STATE RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POWER.

Whatever the *rights* of the States may be, they can not include nor sanctify State *wrongs*. The States have reserved no right to violate the inalienable rights for the protection of which both the State and National Governments were organized. They can have no right to do that which the Federal Constitution, ratified by them, expressly forbids them to do.

However limited the powers of the Federal Government may be, they are not restricted from doing that which pertains essentially, in the nature of things, to all civil government, namely, to protect the personal liberty of its subjects. Such a restriction would render it no civil government at all. The Federal Government is not restricted from the proper exercise of the powers expressly conferred upon it, nor from doing the service which the Constitution expressly requires it to do.

"The Constitution and the *laws* of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof," etc., etc., "shall be THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, *any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.*"

* "With what execration should the statesman be loaded, who, permitting *one half* of the *citizens* thus to trample on the rights of the *other*, transforms those into despots, and these into enemies, destroys the morals of the one part, and the *amor patriæ* of the other! For if a *slave* can have a country in this world, it must be any other than that in which he is born to live and labor for another," etc.—*Notes on Virginia*.

We see this principle professedly acted upon, to enforce unconstitutional enactments, (in favor of slavery,) and it is time to use it to enforce constitutional laws for the protection of liberty.

“The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” (Art. I., Sect. 8, Clause 10.)

“INTENTIONS” AND “UNDERSTANDINGS.”

In the Virginia Convention that ratified the Constitution, Patrick Henry (a member of the Federal Convention) said that Congress, by the Constitution, had “power to pronounce all slaves free.” “There is,” said he, “no ambiguous implication or logical deduction. *The paper speaks to the point. They have the power in clear and unequivocal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it.*”

In the same Convention, Gov. Randolph said: “They insist that the abolition of slavery will result from this Constitution. I hope there is *no one here* who will advance an objection so dishonorable to Virginia. I hope that at the moment they are securing the rights of their citizens, an objection will not be started that those unfortunate men now held in bondage BY THE OPERATION OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT, may be made FREE.”

With this “understanding” the Constitution was ratified by Virginia.

Gen. Wilson, another member of the Federal Convention, from Pennsylvania, assured the people of that State that the Constitution “laid a foundation for banishing slavery out of this country.”

WHAT SLAVEHOLDERS CLAIM.

The clauses commonly quoted in favor of the claims of the slaveholders, do not warrant those claims. And if they did, they could not nullify or abrogate the preceding ones.

The clause concerning "persons held to service and labor in one State, *under the laws thereof*, and escaping to another"—and providing that they "shall be delivered up to the person to whom such service or labor *may be due*," can not apply to slaves. It does not describe their condition. Being held as "chattels personal," they are not recognized as "persons." "Slaves can make no contract;" and, therefore, nothing can be "*due*" from them. There are no laws holding them to "service or labor" in any of the slave States, nor any laws that establish or legalize slavery. The use of the word "service" instead of "servitude," proves that this clause can not apply to "slaves," but only to "free persons;" for this distinction, by the testimony of Mr. Madison, had been made by the Convention itself, in respect to the meaning of these two words:

"Art. I., Sec. 2. On motion of Mr. Randolph, the word '*servitude*' was struck out, and the word '*service*' unanimously inserted; the former being thought to express the *condition* of *slaves*, and the latter the *obligations* of *free* persons." (Madison Papers, Vol. III., page 1569.)

So that this clause can not apply to slaves, but only to apprentices, free laborers, and contractors who had agreed, for a consideration received, to perform "service or labor."

The phrase "*free* persons," in the clause concerning the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes, has been construed as having been used in contradistinction from *aliens*, not slaves. High authorities for this construction are cited by Mr. Spooner. The clause concern-

ing the migration or importation of certain persons previous to 1808, and commonly applied to the African slave-trade, is also susceptible of a different interpretation, as has often been shown. But if this was a "compromise" with slavery, it has long since, by its own limitation, expired, and there is no good reason why the plain and explicit powers vested in the Federal Government should not now be exercised for the abolition of slavery.

MODES OF ABOLISHING SLAVERY.

There are many ways by which the Federal Government, in strict accordance with the Constitution, may abolish slavery. Either *department* of the Government, by itself, may do much, if not all, that would be necessary to secure that result.

The judiciary department is amply competent to the task, in the absence of any legislation whatever. Any one of the Federal Courts has power to issue the writ of habeas corpus to any slave that may demand it. Nay, the judges are under the most solemn constitutional *obligations* to do so. And when the slave and his master are brought into Court, they are bound to "determine whether the cause of his (the slave's) commitment (detention in slavery) *be just*, and thereupon do as JUSTICE shall appertain." In doing this they would follow the illustrious precedents of the Courts of Massachusetts and of Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in the case of Somerset; a decision which immortalized his name, and shed a lustre of unfading glory on the jurisprudence of his country.*

* The effects of this decision are thus celebrated by Cowper:

"Slaves can not breathe in England; if their lungs
Receive our air, that moment they are free;
They touch our country, and their shackles fall.
That's noble, and bespeaks a nation proud
And jealous of the blessing."

If the judiciary fails to do this, the Legislature should provide for it by special enactment.

The same power that establishes the present Federal Courts may, if necessary, establish Federal Courts in every county or town in the Union, and the same authority that appoints the present judges may appoint proper judges in all those courts. (See Art. II., Sect. 2, and Art. III., Sect. 1.)

The President, in the exercise of his appointing power, may appoint to office any slave whom he deems qualified to discharge its duties; and he is bound, by his oath of office, to treat slavery as illegal and unconstitutional in all his official acts. This covers a wide field.

Congress is bound to do the same, and in its organization of the militia, its supervision of the post-offices and the transportation of the mails, to know nothing of slavery or of distinctions of color. It is bound to "guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government" that shall displace slavery; by just *such* measures as it would employ, if a State should establish an "order of nobility" in any other form, or substitute a hereditary monarchy for a representative government.

Congress, by a declaratory enactment, may pronounce all the slaves *citizens*, and, as such, entitled to the protection of the Federal Government. Congress, in the same manner, if need be, may declare the fact of the case as it exists—that slavery is illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Or it may, by appropriate enactments, provide for the naturalization of the slaves and their consequent protection. It may then provide for an apportionment of representation in accordance with the constitutional provision, properly construed, enumerating "three fifths" of the *aliens*, as in contradistinction from "*free persons*," or "all other persons."

The entire subject is within the legitimate action of

the Federal Government, which has been so long wielded for the *support* of slavery. And the people of the Free States, at the ballot-box, can provide for an administration that will, in some way, rid the nation of its great national iniquity.

This is the enterprise to which we invite the friends of liberty in America. We urge its vigorous prosecution as a solemn duty to God, to our country, to the slave, and to mankind. God holds nations responsible for national sins. He holds the people of all nations responsible for the *execution of justice* by their national governments. And under republican governments, where the people elect their own rulers, there can be no shadow of excuse for their neglect of this duty.

ABOLITION SOCIETY

OF

NEW-YORK CITY AND VICINITY.

CONSTITUTION.

ART. I. This Society shall be called The Abolition Society of New-York City and Vicinity.

ART. II. Its object shall be to secure the immediate and unconditional abolition of American Slavery.

ART. III. Its leading sentiments are these:

1. Slaveholding is sinful, illegal, and unconstitutional. It has no right to be in the Church or in the State. It is to be excluded from the former as a scandal, and prohibited by the latter as a crime. It is not sanctioned by the Bible or the Constitution, but is condemned by both.

2. It is the duty of the Federal Government, in all its departments, to suppress slaveholding throughout the United States.

3. It is the duty of the several State governments to sustain the Federal Government in this measure, to protect their citizens, and all who touch their soil, from seizures by kidnappers or slaveholders, under the Fugitive Slave Bill, or otherwise; to make all attempts at the execution of that unconstitutional and atrocious Act a penal offense; and to extend the right of suffrage and eligibility to office to all their citizens, irrespective of race or complexion.

4. It is the duty of the citizens, at the ballot-box, to provide State and national administrations that will make these measures paramount objects of their activity; to secure a judiciary that will execute justice; to vote for such candidates for office, and for such only, as are tried friends of the enslaved, and publicly known to be earnestly engaged in promoting these measures.

5. It is the duty of Christians to hold no Church relations that involve religious fellowship or ecclesiastical connection with slaveholders. It is also their duty to sustain no Missionary Society having complicity with slaveholding, nor any Tract Society, or other religious publishing Society that does not expose and rebuke the heinous sin of slaveholding, in common with other sins.

ART. IV. The action of the Society will be directed to the furtherance of its objects, the propagation of its principles, the advocacy and promotion of its proposed public measures, in all suitable ways; particularly by personal example, and by the publication and circulation of cheap tracts, the employment of lecturers, and assisting to sustain a periodical, adapted to these purposes.

ART. V. Any person approving these objects, principles, and measures, and pledged to their support, by effort and example, may become a member of this Society by enrolling his name and contributing to its funds.

ART. VI. The Officers of this Society shall be a President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer, who, together with ten others, shall constitute an Executive Committee, five of whom shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

ART. VII. The annual meeting of the Society, for election of officers and the transaction of other appropriate business, shall be held in the month of October, under direction of the Executive Committee.

ART. VIII. No amendment shall be made in this Constitution without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present at a regular annual meeting, nor unless the proposed amendment has been submitted to a previous meeting, or to the Executive Committee in season to be published by them (as it shall be their duty to do, if so submitted,) at the regular official notification of the meeting.

OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY.

LEWIS TAPPAN, President.
 JAMES McCUNE SMITH, Vice-President.
 W. E. WHITING, Treasurer.
 WILLIAM GOODELL, Secretary.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, in addition to the preceding:

SIMEON S. JOCELYN,	CHARLES B. RAY,
I. R. BARBOUR,	JOHN W. HILL,
SAMUEL WILDE,	WM. T. DAWLEY,
GEO. WHIPPLE,	HEZ. D. SHARPE,
WM. H. PILLOW,	G. S. WELLS.





